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Abstract 
Income inequality came to the fore with the recent financial crisis, when many authors pointed at it as 
the main cause of the crisis. This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of the relationship 
between income inequality and the recent global financial crisis. It assesses whether inequality before 
the crisis is related to the severity of the crisis. Then, it analyzes the extent to which crisis severity 
affected the subsequent inequality dynamics. The analysis is conducted on a sample of 146 countries, 
being in that way the most comprehensive study on these issues. It puts a particular emphasis on the 
differences between advanced and developing economies. Results suggest that income inequality 
before the crisis potentially contributed to a severer output drops during the crisis of 2007-2008. The 
effect of the overall population inequality (Gini index) has been found severer than the one of the top 
1% earners’ income share. The latter effect is found particularly stronger in developing economies. 
Then, crisis severity is found important only for the increase of the income share of top 1% earners in 
developing economies after the crisis. Moreover, those of them who went through a severer crisis, 
were followed with faster accumulation of the income in the top 1%. 
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1. Introduction 
Many have pointed at the rising inequality as the fundamental cause of the Global Financial Crisis of 
2007-2008: Stiglitz (2009), Milanovic (2009), Wade (2009), Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010), Rajan 
(2010), IMF-ILO (2010), Kumhof and Rancière (2015), Kumhof et al. (2012), Galbraith (2012), 
Palley (2012), Stockhammer  (2015). While there are some differences in the elaborations, the main 
idea is that the shift of income towards the rich and the fall of the middle class in the US, created 
political pressures which were accommodated by easier credit. This created a credit boom, 
particularly among the lower and middle classes, and eventually led to a financial crisis in the US, 
which spread to the rest of the world. Kumhof et al. (2012), building on the ideas in Kumhof and 
Rancière (2015), developed an open-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which 
this happens and argue that rising inequality leads to worsening of savings-investment balances, as the 
consumption of the lower and middle classes is financed through the borrowing from the rich and 
foreign lenders. 
The empirical front for investigating the role of inequality for the emergence of the Global Financial 
Crisis has been rising. Kumhof et al. (2012) confirm their hypothesis from a panel regression for 18 
OECD countries for the period 1968-2008. However, other empirical works started to question this 
finding. For instance, Bordo and Meissner (2012) run a panel regression of 14 advanced economies 
for a longer period (1920-2008) and conclude that while financial crises typically follow a period of 
credit boom, inequality only seldom increases under credit expansion. In the same line, Atkinson and 
Morelli (2010) rely on a cross-country empirical analysis, to conclude that: “[o]utside the US, the 
history of systemic banking crises in different countries around the world does not suggest that either 
rising or high inequality has been adduced as a significant causal factor.” (p.66). Therefore, there is no 
a clear-cut that inequality resulting from a credit-financed boom, led to the financial crisis. For survey 
of the theoretical and empirical literature on this issue, refer to van Treeck (2014).   
Several studies later discussed changes in income inequality after the Global Financial Crisis. Piketty 
and Saez (2013) discuss trends in the top percentile/decile share in income in several developed 
countries. They find that the decline in inequality of 2008 and 2009 was reversed in 2010 and argue 
that the long-run rising trend of inequality is unlikely to change in the future, unless significant policy 
reforms are undertaken. The volume edited by Jenkins et al. (2013) provides a detailed and thorough 
analysis of how income distribution changed with the crisis in 21 OECD countries. The main finding 
is that it changed a little between 2007 and 2009, due to the government support through the tax and 
benefit system, but that it is likely to change in the following years towards greater inequality, due to 
the fiscal consolidation measures. Agnello and Sousa (2012) and Ball et al. (2013) focus explicitly on 
the effects of the fiscal consolidation, arguing that it is likely to increase inequality in the developed 
countries.  
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Finally, some recent studies proposed policy measures to prevent rising inequality. Piketty (2014) 
recommends global and progressive tax on wealth and highly progressive marginal taxes on income. 
IMF (2014) proposes a set of fiscal measures, including greater use of taxes on property and energy, 
progressive income taxes, conditional cash transfers, better targeted social assistance programs and 
improved access to education and health services. Atkinson (2015) proposes 15 measures, including 
tax reform, public works, introducing living wage and establishing a public investment authority. 
Stiglitz (2015) gives eight proposals on how to rewrite the rules of the American economy, including 
increasing competition, reforming the financial system, increasing labor rights and reforming the tax 
and transfers system.  
The considerations about how income inequality may have led to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-
2008, as well how inequality developed after the crisis, brought the topic to the forefront of economic 
discussions. The aim of this study is to analyze the relationship between income inequality and the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. The analysis is conducted on a sample of 146 countries (i.e. all 
the countries on which data are available), being in that way the most comprehensive study on the 
issue in the literature in general.  
While the issues that this paper aims to address – the role of the rising inequality for the severity of 
the recent financial crisis and the developments in inequality after the crisis – have not been neglected 
in the literature, there are several gaps in the existing corpus of knowledge. To begin with, there are 
no studies on the role of inequality for the severity of crises. In other words, it is hard to argue that the 
recent financial crisis spread from the US to the rest of the world because of income inequality; still, 
income inequality may explain why some countries suffered more during the crisis. Then, whereas 
several studies have discussed developments in inequality after the recent crisis, they almost 
exclusively focus on developed countries, leaving developing countries aside. Finally, existing 
literature on developments in inequality after the crisis has been mostly descriptive in nature, which 
may be understandable, given the low number of countries they analyzed but certainly warrants a 
space for more rigorous econometric assessment. This study fills these gaps. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief overview stylized facts about the 
investigated relationships. Section 3 presents the methodology and the data used. Section 4 presents 
the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Stylized facts 
Before we embark on a more rigorous econometric analysis, we provide some stylized facts about 
inequality and its potential correlation with or contribution to the severity of the Global Crisis of 2007-
2008. We have on disposal a sample of 146 countries, which is sufficient to represent the globe. The 
average Gini index – the most widespread measure of inequality – globally, before the crisis, has been 
5 
 
38.2%, while the average income share of the top 1% earners has been 9.1%. However, expectedly, 
there is pronounced heterogeneity globally, likely associated with the type of the capitalist system 
applied, but also to the level of development. We are particularly interested in the second aspect. Figure 
1 presents the distribution of the two measures and detects the areas of concern. First, there is clear 
difference in the levels of the distribution of the Gini index (left): developed countries did have 
indisputably higher levels of inequality before the crisis than developing economies, but were also more 
diverse. 
Similarly, inequality distribution observed through top 1% earners suggests that income shares in the 
advanced countries are more heterogeneous, with a pronounced concentration of countries where the 
top 1% income share is above 10%, which is not the case in the developing countries. 
Figure 1 – Inequality before the crisis in advanced and developing economies  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Figure 2 presents the correlation between the output gap during the crisis and the inequality before the 
crisis. There is slight negative correlation – whichever inequality indicator is used – suggesting that 
early inequality may imply deeper output drops. 
Figure 2 – Output gap during the crisis (2007-2009) and income inequality before the crisis 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
-1
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
O
u
tp
u
t 
g
a
p
20 30 40 50 60
Gini coefficient
Output gap Fitted values
-1
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
O
u
tp
u
t 
g
a
p
5 10 15 20
Income share of top 1%
Output gap Fitted values
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 5 10 15 20 25
Top 1% income share
Advanced economies
Developing economies
Top 1%
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
D
e
n
s
it
y
0 20 40 60 80
Top 1% income share
Advanced economies
Developing economies
Gini index
6 
 
However, when the sample is disaggregated on advanced and developing economies, some 
differences emerge. Figure 3 replicates Figure 2 for developed (upper two graphs) and for developing 
economies (lower two graphs). It is noticeable that the negative correlation on Figure 2 is sourced in 
the developing sample only, i.e. that the correlation likely does not exist in the advanced economies. 
Hence, while developing economies faced lower income inequality before the crisis, they also, on 
average, faced deeper output declines at higher levels of inequality. This aligns with the notion that 
the two groups should be observed separately. 
Figure 3 – Output gap during the crisis (2007-2009) and income inequality before the crisis – 
advanced (upper graphs) versus developing (lower graphs) economies 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The average income inequality across countries after the crisis increased at 41% (Gini) and at 10.6% 
(top 1%). Both – developed and developing countries – noted an increase in both indicators, despite 
the pre-crisis differences have been maintained (Figure 4). However, interestingly, the top 1% share 
distribution clearly started becoming double-humped, the second hump being formed in the 10-15% 
range of the income share, and more pronounced among the advanced economies. 
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Figure 4 – Inequality after the crisis in advanced and developing economies  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Figure 5 presents the distributions of inequality by dividing the sample of countries based on the 
severity of the crisis over the period 2007-2009. Countries have been classified on those with high 
severity, mild and low or no severity (hence, including countries which experienced high positive 
output gap). The classification is based on the tertile in which the country belongs, applied on the 
output gap variable. On the graphs below, moving from the short-dashed through the long-dashed to 
the solid line refers to a move from high to low/no crisis severity. The graphs suggest that higher 
severity is associated with higher inequality, the latter being (re-)structured through the emergence of 
a second hump. 
Figure 5 – Inequality after the crisis and the severity of the crisis  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The general conclusion, though, likely does not refer to advanced economies (Figure 6, upper), as no 
robust inter-pattern among the three lines could be established. However, it refers to developing 
economies even forcibly (Figure 6, lower graphs). Observing the left lower graph – distribution of the 
Gini index – the left-skewness of the Gini distribution for developing countries with high and mild 
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severity of the crisis is evident, as compared to those with low/no severity. The same conclusion is 
valid when the top 1% income share distribution is observed (lower right graph). 
Figure 6 – Inequality after the crisis and the severity of the crisis: advanced (upper) versus 
developing economies (lower graphs) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Overall, pre-crisis inequality is likely negatively correlated with the severity of the subsequent crisis 
2007-2008, but the conclusion is likely valid for developing economies, despite advanced economies 
faced higher levels of pre-crisis inequality. The picture – in terms of inequality level differences - did 
not considerably change after the crisis. It seems that the severity of the crisis has been negatively 
impinging on the post-crisis inequality: higher post-crisis inequality is observed in countries who went 
through more severe output declines. Again, nonetheless, the conclusion is likely valid only for the 
developing economies. 
In what follows, we upgrade the analysis, through establishing the relationships in a regression, hence 
controlling for additional effects. 
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3. Methodology and data 
The essence of this paper consists of two parts: the one examining the role of the early inequality for 
the severity of the subsequent crisis, while the other the role of the severity of the crisis on the post-
crisis inequality developments. To achieve the first objective, we rely on the following economic 
model: 
𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡_𝑝𝑐 + ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑋𝑖 +𝜀𝑖     (1) 
Whereby: 𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 is the severity of the crisis measured through the difference between the current 
GDP and the average/potential GDP for country i, as percentage of the potential GDP;  
𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡_𝑝𝑐 is a measure of inequality of country i before the crisis (hence the subscript (t_pc)), 
appearing in two forms: the Gini coefficient and the income share of the richest 1% of the population. 
𝑋𝑖 includes other explanatory variables, to control for certain influences: variables which are 
commonly used in the literature: government consumption, credit and inflation. By having these three 
variables in the equation, the effect of the two key policies – fiscal and monetary – for the support of 
the economic activity, including output stabilization, have been captured. 𝛼 stands for the constant, 
while 𝜀𝑖 is the usual idiosyncratic error which is assumed to be well-behaved. 
To achieve the second objective, we rely on the following economic model: 
𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡_𝑐𝑟 + 𝛽1𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (2) 
Whereby: inequality and severity of the crisis are as in (1), with the distinction that severity refers to 
the crisis period (hence the subscript (t_cr)); 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖 refers to the government spending on social 
benefits in GDP, 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖 is the share of personal income tax and social contribution in GDP; while 𝑋𝑖 
includes a set of variable to capture labor market context: labor market regulations, cooperation in 
labor-employer relations, effectiveness of antimonopoly policy, flexibility of wage determination, and 
labor market efficiency. 𝛼 and 𝜀𝑖 are as before. 
Equations (1) and (2) are calculated through OLS. This is the most commonly used econometric 
technique, which gives the association between different variables. In addition, we use Bayesian 
econometrics. Bayesian econometrics is the alternative branch of econometrics, which does not rely 
only on information from measured data, but also uses insights from economic theory. Simply put, it 
combines researchers’ beliefs about the relationship between variables with information from the 
measured data. The Bayesian technique that will be used is the Bayesian model averaging (BMA). 
This technique is appropriate when there is uncertainty regarding the underlying theoretical model and 
when there are many explanatory variables. It is suitable in our case because we do not have a clear 
theoretical model for our analysis, and we have a large number of explanatory variables. BMA, in 
essence, estimates all the possible models of the available variables and calculates weighted averages 
of these models in order to produce the estimates. It is, therefore, an objective way to derive inference 
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in situations in which there are many variables, which makes the classical approach subjective. BMA 
is applied in a similar fashion as the OLS, i.e. for the same two questions.  
The analysis is cross-sectional (cross-country), i.e. the unit of analysis will be different countries in 
the same point of time. However, as noted in (1) and (2), there are variables which refer to a previous 
time period, hence introducing limited time dimension in the model. 
Data on inequality are from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database of Frederick Solt 
(2013). This is currently the most comprehensive database on income inequality that covers 146 
countries for the period since 1960. It combines several sources on income inequality and standardizes 
them. Other data are from standard sources, such as the databases of the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. The output gap is obtained by HP filtering (standard lambda of 1600) and is 
expressed as % of the potential output. All used variables and their definitions and sources are 
provided in the Appendix. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Is inequality a factor for crisis severity? 
We embark on presenting and discussing the results. Table 1 presents the findings for the relationship 
between the inequality before the crisis and the crisis severity. Recall, crisis severity is captured through 
the output gap, suggesting that the lower the output gap (as % of the long-term output), the severes the 
crisis felt. Inequality is represented through two variables: the net Gini coefficients and the share of the 
top 1% earners in each country. The results are presented for three years: 2007, 2008 and 2009. This is 
done to capture the different timings of the crisis manifestation: it started in the US in 2007, but has 
been transmitted to other countries in 2008 and felt onto the economies in late-2008 or 2009. Actually, 
for a large share of developing economies, 2009 has been the year registering output declines. Then, for 
each of these years, we use three variants of the inequality measures in terms of their before-crisis 
timings: the year before, two years before and three years before. Hence, e.g. for the crisis severity in 
2008, we test whether inequality level measured in 2005, 2006 and 2007 has had a significant 
relationship with it. 
Results are quite appealing. Wherever the Gini index before the crisis was higher by 1 percentage point 
(p.p.), the crisis was severer by 0.2 p.p. to 0.28 p.p. of the potential GDP. Therefore, a country with a 
Gini of 46% (cca. the third quartile of the Gini distribution), on average, experienced deeper output 
contraction by 3.4 p.p. to 4.8 p.p. of its potential output, compared to a country with a Gini of 29% (cca. 
the first quartile of the Gini distribution). 
Similarly, wherever top 1% earners earned additional 1 p.p. of country income, the crisis has been 
severer by 0.22 p.p. to 0.31 p.p. of the potential GDP. This implies that, a country where top 1% earners 
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had 11% of country income (cca. the third quartile of the top 1% distribution), on average, experienced 
higher output contraction by 1.1 p.p. to 1.6 p.p. of its potential output, compared to a country where top 
1% earned 6% of total income (cca. the first quartile of the distribution). Hence, overall, income 
inequality measured through the top 1% earners was less severe for output during the crisis than the one 
approximated through the Gini index. 
However, when moving along time (from 2007 to 2009), it is noticeable that the relationship of the 
income distribution with crisis severity strengthens when inequality is measured through the top 1% 
income share, while strengthens in 2008 and then vanishes in 2009 when it is measured through the 
Gini index. This may suggest that both inequality measures follow different properties, which may 
actually be the case. Namely, many countries during the crisis embarked on fiscal spending which likely 
affected the overall income distribution (i.e. was aimed at increasing the income share of the poor), but 
not necessarily affected the pace with which the income of the top 1% grew. 
Table 1 – Baseline results 
2007 
 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Gini (lagged) -0.218***  -0.200***  -0.209***  
(0.068)  (0.063)  (0.063)  
Top 1% share 
(lagged) 
 -0.223**  -0.251**  -0.271** 
 (0.111)  (0.107)  (0.105) 
Government 
consumption 
-0.117* -0.101 -0.116* -0.11 -0.119** -0.116* 
(0.070) (0.084) (0.064) (0.071) (0.059) (0.066) 
Credit  0.0128* 0.0245*** 0.00722 0.0194** 0.00452 0.0174** 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Inflation 0.544** 0.522** 0.418** 0.402* 0.392* 0.374* 
(0.215) (0.217) (0.202) (0.206) (0.199) (0.203) 
Constant 11.28*** 4.226** 11.87*** 5.758*** 12.69*** 6.384*** 
(3.133) (2.018) (3.066) (2.001) (3.041) (1.997) 
Observations 118 118 131 131 130 130 
R-squared 0.205 0.141 0.173 0.117 0.178 0.117 
2008 
 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Gini (lagged) -0.279***  -0.259***  -0.244***  
(0.081)  (0.079)  (0.072)  
Top 1% share 
(lagged) 
 -0.292**  -0.261**  -0.277** 
 (0.115)  (0.110)  (0.109) 
Government 
consumption 
-0.0389 -0.0205 -0.0443 -0.0267 -0.048 -0.0415 
(0.066) (0.080) (0.057) (0.071) (0.049) (0.056) 
Credit  -0.0220* -0.00614 -0.0199* -0.00477 -0.0202* -0.00409 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Inflation 0.351** 0.320** 0.302** 0.285** 0.262** 0.254** 
(0.158) (0.154) (0.144) (0.142) (0.125) (0.127) 
Constant 15.28*** 6.392** 14.72*** 6.212** 14.52*** 6.647*** 
(4.359) (2.833) (4.207) (2.616) (3.829) (2.335) 
Observations 110 110 114 114 125 125 
R-squared 0.216 0.133 0.191 0.113 0.187 0.106 
2009 
 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Gini (lagged) -0.114  -0.113  -0.118  
(0.078)  (0.074)  (0.080)  
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Top 1% share 
(lagged) 
 -0.316***  -0.301***  -0.283** 
 (0.111)  (0.109)  (0.113) 
Government 
consumption 
-0.00584 0.0193 8.03E-06 0.0021 0.00264 0.00491 
(0.119) (0.096) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) 
Credit  -0.0444*** -0.0406*** -0.0422*** -0.0362*** -0.0423*** -0.0362*** 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
Inflation 0.217* 0.184 0.227* 0.207* 0.187 0.164 
(0.125) (0.125) (0.118) (0.118) (0.115) (0.118) 
Constant 7.933 6.095** 7.486* 5.674** 7.703* 5.521** 
(5.206) (2.737) (4.285) (2.242) (4.543) (2.288) 
Observations 99 99 107 107 111 111 
R-squared 0.279 0.296 0.271 0.287 0.263 0.273 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *, ** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors provided in parentheses. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. 
 
Interestingly, the government consumption and credit are negatively correlated with the output gap in 
some of the specifications. In particular, the government consumption is negatively correlated with the 
gap in 2007, while the credit in 2008 and 2009. However, as we rely on contemporaneous relationships 
for these two, they could be understood as the immediate reactions of economic policies when the crisis 
hit: faced with declining output (mainly manifested through a cease of capital inflows, reduction of 
investment consumption and export), fiscal authorities embarked on increasing of government 
consumption, while monetary authorities – to the extent exchange rate flexibility permitted – embarked 
on accommodative monetary policy implying eased credit conditions. In both cases, hence, the 
correlation between the output gap on the one side, and government consumption and credit, on the 
other, is negative, and potentially implies a reverse causation. On the other hand, the relationship with 
inflation is expectedly positive. 
As we are uncertain regarding the underlying theoretical model and the inclusion of the explanatory 
variables, we provide results from the Bayesian model averaging technique. Table 2 suggests that our 
previous findings and conclusions are corroborated. 
Table 2 – Bayesian model averaging 
2007 
 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Gini (lagged) -0.226***  -0.204***  -0.209***  
(0.062)  (0.054)  (0.054)  
Top 1% share 
(lagged) 
 -0.202  -0.240*  -0.268** 
 (0.138)  (0.128)  (0.128) 
Government 
consumption 
-0.0461 -0.0234 -0.0493 -0.029 -0.0589 -0.0365 
(0.065) (0.049) (0.065) (0.054) (0.069) (0.059) 
Credit  0.00165 0.0101 0.000448 0.00379 0.000148 0.00236 
(0.006) (0.013) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) 
Inflation 0.474*** 0.392* 0.347** 0.21 0.323* 0.164 
(0.151) (0.210) (0.164) (0.192) (0.168) (0.180) 
Constant 11.57*** 4.458* 11.76*** 6.375*** 12.36*** 7.181*** 
(2.895) (2.354) (2.540) (2.031) (2.555) (2.044) 
Observations 118 118 131 131 130 130 
2008 
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 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Gini (lagged) -0.243***  -0.225***  -0.216***  
(0.073)  (0.070)  (0.062)  
Top 1% share 
(lagged) 
 -0.291*  -0.261*  -0.277** 
 (0.159)  (0.151)  (0.139) 
Government 
consumption 
-0.00462 -0.00245 -0.00566 -0.00325 -0.00669 -0.00538 
(0.024) (0.021) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) 
Credit  -0.00867 -0.00122 -0.00772 -0.00128 -0.00985 -0.00121 
(0.014) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.014) (0.005) 
Inflation 0.403*** 0.325** 0.341** 0.268* 0.282* 0.226 
(0.138) (0.138) (0.146) (0.145) (0.147) (0.140) 
Constant 11.99*** 5.700** 11.62*** 5.757** 11.94*** 6.137*** 
(3.720) (2.291) (3.687) (2.327) (3.657) (2.216) 
Observations 110 110 114 114 125 125 
2009 
 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Gini (lagged) -0.110*  -0.109*  -0.116**  
(0.064)  (0.060)  (0.057)  
Top 1% share 
(lagged) 
 -0.334**  -0.308**  -0.294** 
 (0.136)  (0.124)  (0.116) 
Government 
consumption 
-0.00052 0.00152 -0.00056 -0.00041 -0.00023 -5.16E-05 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Credit  -0.0490*** -0.0442*** -0.0461*** -0.0402*** -0.0462*** -0.0399*** 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Inflation 0.0645 0.0411 0.0834 0.0637 0.0513 0.0352 
(0.120) (0.097) (0.130) (0.115) (0.101) (0.084) 
Constant 8.639*** 7.398*** 8.204*** 6.639*** 8.517*** 6.496*** 
(2.987) (1.780) (2.751) (1.604) (2.588) (1.452) 
Observations 99 99 107 107 111 111 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *, ** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors provided in parentheses. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. 
 
Finally, we split the sample on advanced and developing economies, to identify potentially different 
patterns of the crisis severity – inequality nexus. To preserve space, we present the results for 2008 
only. Table 3 presents the results. Inequality is negatively related with output in both groups, but with 
apparent differences. If inequality is measured through the Gini, then it exerted slightly severer effect 
on output during the crisis in developed economies, corroborating the observation on Figure 1. 
However, in the same group, the size of the top 1% earners share was insignificant for the severity of 
crisis, which may be an unexpected result, but could be reconciled with the heterogeneity of the group 
(which comprehends countries from Denmark to the US). On the other hand, how much the top 1% 
grasped from income has been important for the severity of crisis in developing economies and exerted 
quite large negative effect. Increasing the top 1% income share by 6 p.p. (cca. the move from the first 
to the third quartile) is related with 1.7 p.p. to 2 p.p. decline in output, which is expectedly larger than 
the overall effect in Table 1. 
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Table 3 – Results based on the level of country development 
Advanced economies 
 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Gini (lagged) -0.346**  -0.326**  -0.320**  
(0.141)  (0.140)  (0.140)  
Top 1% share 
(lagged) 
 -0.2  -0.222  -0.269 
 (0.197)  (0.208)  (0.210) 
Government 
consumption 
-0.249* -0.136 -0.231 -0.139 -0.219 -0.143 
(0.141) (0.192) (0.140) (0.188) (0.137) (0.185) 
Credit  -0.0126 -0.0155 -0.0135 -0.0152 -0.0143 -0.0152 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Inflation 1.479*** 1.341*** 1.458*** 1.343*** 1.441*** 1.342*** 
(0.285) (0.253) (0.290) (0.257) (0.293) (0.261) 
Constant 14.78** 5.017 14.06** 5.236 13.82** 5.698 
(5.715) (5.259) (5.557) (5.227) (5.354) (5.182) 
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36 
R-square 0.676 0.619 0.67 0.621 0.668 0.626 
Developing economies 
 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Gini (lagged) -0.321***  -0.298**  -0.264**  
(0.121)  (0.121)  (0.103)  
Top 1% share 
(lagged) 
 -0.336**  -0.288**  -0.283** 
 (0.132)  (0.122)  (0.123) 
Government 
consumption 
-0.0331 -0.0289 -0.0374 -0.0341 -0.0406 -0.0481 
(0.071) (0.076) (0.060) (0.066) (0.051) (0.052) 
Credit  -0.00356 -0.00429 0.00214 0.000106 -0.00199 0.000544 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) 
Inflation 0.241 0.275* 0.198 0.244* 0.173 0.218* 
(0.151) (0.159) (0.137) (0.144) (0.120) (0.127) 
Constant 17.33*** 6.874** 16.48*** 6.394** 15.47*** 6.621*** 
(6.235) (3.149) (6.043) (2.847) (5.208) (2.497) 
Observations 74 74 78 78 89 89 
R-square 0.188 0.105 0.168 0.087 0.166 0.086 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *, ** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors provided in parentheses. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. 
 
 
4.2. Does severe crisis undermine income equality? 
We next present the results for the relationship between crisis severity and the subsequent inequality 
outcomes. Table 4 presents the data based on the OLS method. As before, the output gap is used to 
reflect the severity with which the crisis hit a country, and is taken to be the average of the 2007-2009 
period. While, the inequality is observed per year, in a cross-section context, for the period 2010-2013. 
However, we control for the time dimension by including a time indicator. 
Results provide limited evidence that the severity of the crisis affected the subsequent inequality 
dynamics. Namely, the output gap is significant only in the equation for the whole sample, when 
inequality is measured through the income share of the top 1%. However, when the sample is split on 
advanced and developing economies, this significance is lost. From the controls, some variables are 
significant in some of the equations, but are frequently not correctly signed, with the exception of tax 
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wedge and social transfers, whose increase is found to be associated with reduction of inequality, though 
mainly in developing economies. 
Table 4 – Results for inequality (OLS) 
 Entire sample Advanced 
economies 
Developing 
economies 
 Gini Top 1% Gini Top 1% Gini Top 1% 
Output gap -0.114 -0.287*** -0.164 -0.157 0.274 -0.157 
(0.179) (0.091) (0.191) (0.115) (0.320) (0.159) 
Taxes and soc. Contributions 
(% of GDP) 
-0.114* -0.0462 0.0384 0.0449 -0.143 -0.0951* 
(0.065) (0.032) (0.079) (0.045) (0.092) (0.051) 
Social transfers (% of GDP) -0.178*** -0.0260* -0.0448 0.0123 -0.155*** -0.0269 
(0.031) (0.016) (0.040) (0.020) (0.055) (0.039) 
Labour market regulation 
(0=high to 10 = low) 
-0.345 -0.2 -0.212 -0.00619 -1.875** -0.915* 
(0.594) (0.301) (0.484) (0.254) (0.871) (0.523) 
Effectiveness of antimonopoly 
policy (1=low to 7 = high) 
-0.0341 -1.035 -1.961 -1.803** 5.630** 0.216 
(1.831) (0.832) (1.273) (0.856) (2.462) (1.431) 
Labor Market Efficiency 
(1=low to 7 = high) 
-1.782 1.115 1.979 3.317** 0.638 0.11 
(2.232) (1.318) (1.915) (1.462) (3.551) (2.500) 
Flexibility of wage 
determination (1=low to 7 = 
high) 
1.206 0.313 1.643** 0.642 -0.482 -0.765 
(0.824) (0.380) (0.628) (0.468) (1.625) (0.832) 
Cooperation in labor-
employer relations (1=low to 
7 = high) 
-1.366 -0.29 -1.397 -1.252 0.311 1.776 
(1.785) (0.860) (0.999) (0.775) (2.717) (1.657) 
Year -0.591 0.194 -0.293 -0.135 0.0181 0.654 
 (1.195) (0.602) (0.953) (0.598) (1.946) (1.031) 
Constant 59.32*** 14.38*** 32.11*** 2.931 38.82*** 15.70** 
 (5.383) (2.975) (5.850) (3.285) (10.010) (6.984) 
       
Observations 127 127 69 69 58 58 
R-squared 0.409 0.19 0.319 0.302 0.229 0.262 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *, ** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors provided in parentheses. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. 
 
Therefore, as variables’ uncertainty is more prevalent in this model, we present and rely on the results 
from the Bayesian model averaging. This is further important for this equation, as the theoretical model 
is lacking and hence the inclusion of the control variables may be uncertain. Table 5 provides these 
results. They seem more robust. It is clearer that the significance in the top 1% equation for the overall 
sample is drawn from the developing-countries sample. The coefficient suggests that the smaller the 
output gap as percent of the potential GDP (inferring severer crisis), implies higher inequality 
afterwards. In particular, if the output gap has been lower by 1 p.p. of the potential, the subsequent 
inequality would have increased by 0.24 p.p. The result is valid only for the top 1% inequality in 
developing economies, and not for the population-wide inequality. 
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Table 5 – Results for inequality (BMA) 
 Entire sample Advanced 
economies 
Developing 
economies 
 Gini Top 1% Gini Top 1% Gini Top 1% 
Output gap -0.0724 -0.243*** -0.0892 -0.103 -0.12 -0.242** 
(0.164) (0.090) (0.151) (0.099) (0.262) (0.111) 
Taxes and soc. Contributions 
(% of GDP) 
-0.0912 -0.0477 0.00141 0.00285 -0.00435 -0.0203 
(0.082) (0.043) (0.023) (0.017) (0.040) (0.042) 
Social transfers (% of GDP) -0.191*** -0.0139 -0.017 0.000812 -0.0726 -0.0083 
(0.034) (0.020) (0.028) (0.007) (0.080) (0.022) 
Labour market regulation 
(0=high to 10 = low) 
-0.0365 -0.0013 -0.0161 0.0798 -0.197 -0.194 
(0.237) (0.096) (0.188) (0.231) (0.583) (0.403) 
Effectiveness of antimonopoly 
policy (1=low to 7 = high) 
-0.487 -0.65 -0.612 -0.516 1.101 -0.118 
(1.203) (0.861) (1.123) (0.949) (2.004) (0.533) 
Labor Market Efficiency 
(1=low to 7 = high) 
-1.079 0.0936 -0.00235 1.363 -0.108 -0.0331 
(1.751) (0.406) (0.725) (1.694) (1.272) (0.766) 
Flexibility of wage 
determination (1=low to 7 = 
high) 
0.36 0.157 1.897*** 0.67 -0.128 -0.0873 
(0.769) (0.338) (0.601) (0.590) (0.674) (0.395) 
Cooperation in labor-
employer relations (1=low to 
7 = high) 
-1.211 0.00982 -0.237 -0.526 0.327 0.509 
(1.424) (0.194) (0.588) (0.862) (1.258) (1.013) 
Constant 59.15*** 14.63*** 26.71*** 4.051 42.04*** 13.03** 
 (6.272) (3.114) (6.553) (3.558) (9.689) (5.079) 
       
Observations 127 127 69 69 58 58 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *, ** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors provided in parentheses. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was to contribute to the understanding of the relationship between income 
inequality and the Global financial crisis of 2007-2008. The paper addressed two sub-questions of the 
broader topic on the nexus inequality-crisis: first, it assessed whether inequality before the crisis has 
been related with the severity of the crisis. Then, it analyzed the extent to which crisis severity 
affected the subsequent inequality dynamics. We relied on a sample of 146 countries, being in that 
way the most comprehensive study on these issues. Particularly, we put the emphasis on the 
dichotomy of advanced and developing economies, as most of the previous studies focused on US or 
the OECD countries. That way, we were able to provide comparative evidence. 
Results suggest that income inequality before the crisis potentially contributed to a severer output drops 
during the crisis. The effect of the overall population inequality (Gini index) has been found severer 
than the one of the top 1% earners. Moreover, for the advanced economies, the contribution of the 
inequality of the top 1% earners for the crisis severity is found insignificant. On the other hand, for 
developing economies, the contribution of the overall inequality for the subsequent crisis severity has 
been found slightly lower, while the one of the top 1% earners important and fairly large in size. Results 
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also suggest that crisis severity has been important only for the increase of the income share of top 1% 
earners in developing economies, in the period after the crisis. Those of them who went through a 
severer crisis, were followed with faster accumulation of the income in the top 1%. 
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Appendix: Variables and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Gini Gini coefficient after government 
redistribution 
Standardized World Income 
Inequality database, version 4, of 
Solt (2013) 
Top 1% Income share of the top 1% earners 
Output gap HP filter applied on expenditure-side 
real GDP at chained PPPs (in mil. 
2005 USD), per capita. 
% of potential output 
Penn World Tables, version 8.1 of 
Feenstra et al. (2015). 
Government 
consumption 
Government consumption as % of 
GDP 
World Development Indicators 
Credit Credit as % of GDP 
Inflation Growth of CPI index, annual 
Social transfers General government expenditure on 
social benefits (2001 manual), as a 
percent of GDP. 
International Monetary Fund’s 
Government Finance Statistics 
Taxes General government revenues from 
taxes and social contributions (2001 
manual), as a percent of GDP 
Labour market 
regulation 
Labor market regulations index. 
Ranges between 0 and 10. Higher 
values mean lower regulation. 
Economic Freedom of the World 
database, of Gwartney et al. 
(2014) 
Effectiveness of 
anti-monopoly 
policy 
Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy 
index. Ranges between 1 and 7. Higher 
values indicate more effective 
monopoly control. 
Global competitiveness report of 
the World Economic Forum 
Cooperation in 
labor-employer 
relations 
Cooperation in labor-employer 
relations index. Ranges between 1 and 
7. Higher values indicate better 
cooperation in labor-employer 
relations. 
Labor Market 
Efficiency 
Labor Market Efficiency index. 
Ranges between 1 and 7. Higher 
values indicate more efficient labor 
market. 
Flexibility of wage 
determination 
Flexibility of wage determination 
index. Ranges between 1 and 7. Higher 
values indicate more flexible wage 
determination. 
 
